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SHELTER FROM THE STORM: THE NEED
FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LEGISLATION
IN ALASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1970s and 1980s have been marked by change and uncer-
tainty concerning employment terminations. The common law princi-
ple governing the employment relationship for the past century, the
employment-at-will doctrine,' has slowly been eroding. An increased
willingness by state courts to create exceptions to the at-will doctrine
has helped to produce a significant increase in the number of nonunion
employees challenging their discharge. Thus, the wrongful discharge
doctrine2 has emerged.
Alaska is one of thirty-nine jurisdictions that recognize some
modification to the traditional rule.3 Lacking legislative guidance, the
Alaska Supreme Court has been struggling piecemeal toward a new
conceptualization of legal rules to protect the expectations in the mod-
ern employment relationship. However, in ARCO Alaska, Inc. v.
Akers,4 the Alaska Supreme Court sent a message that it could no
longer shoulder the burden of reforming the law of the workplace
alone.5 As a result, the time has arrived for the Alaska Legislature to
contemplate a comprehensive law protecting employees against unjust
dismissal.
Copyright © 1989 by Alaska Law Review
1. The American at-will rule was articulated by Horace G. Wood in 1877. H.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
The most cited judicial articulation of the rule reads as follows: "All may dismiss
their employees at will, be it many or few, for good cause, for no cause, or even for
cause morally wrong without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western
& Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884).
2. Gullett & Greenwade, Employment at Will: The No Fault Alternative, 39 LA-
BOR L.J. 372, 373 (1988).
3. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505: 51-2 (Jan. 1989).
4. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
5. The court held that "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 1154. The limiting of wrong-
ful discharge damages to lost wages will reduce the number of lawyers willing to take
unjust dismissal cases on contingency. The decision means only highly paid execu-
tives will have ready access to counsel and the average nonunion workers who also
need legal representation will be shut out. If the majority of nonunion employees are
to be fully and equally protected against unjust dismissal, legislative assistance will be
necessary.
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This note focuses on developing a statutory mechanism to achieve
a middle ground in the adjudication of nonunion employee dismissals
by providing Alaska's nonunion workers with basic protection against
arbitrary dismissal, while simultaneously limiting the awards obtained
from suing their former employers.6 First, the note will trace the his-
torical justification for the employment-at-will doctrine. Second, the
note will briefly review the nature and limitations of the three theories
most commonly identified by courts as exceptions to the at-will rule.
Third, the line of wrongful discharge cases in Alaska will be discussed,
concentrating on the two most recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions
and their treatment of the "public policy" theory. Finally, legislation
forbidding wrongful discharge that has been introduced or enacted in
various other states will be assessed in order to suggest a framework
for the Alaska Legislature to use in devising a statutory solution to the
Alaska at-will dilemma.
II. THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION
While many reasons have been advanced to explain why the at-
will doctrine became the American rule, the most frequent explanation
is that the rule expresses the freedom of contract ideology prevalent
during the nineteenth century, when the at-will doctrine gained ac-
ceptance. According to this explanation, freedom to make contracts
includes freedom to terminate them unless the parties are expressly
bound for a specified duration.7
A second reason advanced for the at-will presumption is that the
courts in the nineteenth century were adopting a rule that reflected the
then popular laissez faire economic philosophy, thereby emphasizing
the ability of the employer to run its business free from government
interference. Economic efficiency required that the employer have the
absolute right to remove undesirable employees or those who hindered
the employer's ability to produce a fair profit.8 In that age, immigra-
tion had reduced or reversed the American labor shortage, industriali-
zation was developing at a brisk pace and workers frequently changed
6. While the Alaska Supreme Court has eliminated punitive damages in this
area, a limitation on, rather than elimination of, punitive damages would be more
equitable to the parties to an employment dispute. See supra note 5.
7. Some latter-day commentators have rejected this explanation by observing
that the law of contracts that emerged in the late nineteenth century would have sup-
ported a rule whereby courts would create a durational feature based on the intentions
of the contracting parties, contrary to the adoption of an at-will presumption. See
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT.
118, 129-130 (1976).
8. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
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jobs on their own initiative.9 Therefore, a presumption according free-
dom to both employers and employees to terminate their relationship
translated public policy into the realm of the workplace.
Lastly, proponents of the "critical legal studies"' 0 approach argue
that adoption of the at-will rule was a promotion of industrial capital-
ism by the courts."I According to this explanation, at-will termination
protects the capitalist's investment by strengthening the employer's
control over the workplace. The employer had the power to terminate
at will; therefore, employees interested in keeping their jobs were moti-
vated to maintain a high level of productivity. Moreover, the rule al-
lowed employers the freedom to upgrade their staffing or lay off
workers in relation to changes in their production needs.
Although the at-will rule achieved universal adoption and even
constitutional status, 12 legislators eventually discovered that the at-
will rule inadequately protected the interests of employees in many
instances.13 To balance the bargaining power in the employment rela-
tionship, legislators have created exceptions to freedom of contract
along two general lines. First, the establishment of collective bargain-
ing has been legislatively encouraged; and, second, certain minimum
substantive terms and the prohibition of certain conduct has been stat-
utorily established. 14 This note addresses the dismissal of employees
who fall outside either area of the above-mentioned legislative
protections.
9. See Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L.
REV. 632, 641 (1988).
10. The movement known as Critical Legal Studies is founded on a "central de-
scriptive message - that legal ideals are manipulable and that law serves to legitimate
existing maldistributions of wealth and power." Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 327 (1987);
see also R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 52-56 (1986).
11. Feinman, supra note 7, at 131-35.
12. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
13. Beginning with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932), fed-
eral labor legislation attempted either to protect human rights or to introduce the
elements of collective action to counter the employer's economic power. The public
policy provision of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C § 102 (1932), by stating that "the
individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of con-
tract and to protect his freedom of labor," clearly articulates the premise that the
unregulated market inadequately protects the rights of unrepresented workers. See
Leonard, supra note 9, at 642.
14. Leonard, supra note 9, at 642-47. Professor Leonard provides a thorough
discussion of legislative efforts in the areas of collective bargaining and the growth of




III. THEORIES OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The reasons for the upswing in the number of wrongful discharge
lawsuits filed and the growing judicial acceptance of exceptions to the
at-will doctrine are complicated. 15 Whatever the reason, during the
past two decades three main theories have been advanced to challenge
employee dismissals and to minimize the inadequacy of the termina-
ble-at-will rule:16 breach of an implied contract; the tort of wrongful
discharge based upon a violation of public policy; and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Although some courts have failed to recognize any exceptions or
limitations to the employment-at-will doctrine, courts in twenty-nine
states have used the implied contractual limitation on employee dis-
charges, thirty-two states have adopted public policy exceptions and
twelve states apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the
employment relationship.17 A total of thirty-nine states now employ
one or more of the three theories to modify the at-will doctrine.' 8
A. The Implied Contract Theory
In the 1980s, a number of state courts accepted new contractual
modifications to employment at will. The cases that develop this the-
ory impose a contractual obligation upon an employer based on state-
ments of policy evoking a "just cause" standard found in personnel
manuals or employee handbooks, or a contractual obligation arising
from oral representations made to employees concerning procedural
fairness. The reported cases reflecting this trend describe company
policy statements and handbooks introduced into evidence containing
procedures for addressing disciplinary problems. In addition, these
handbooks embrace concepts familiar from the unionized sector, such
15. Among the explanations for the increased protection of the at-will worker are
the increased public awareness of fairness in the workplace, the decline of labor un-
ions, the displacement of mid-level managers as a result of corporate mergers, the use
of labor legislation in the United States and the rise of reverse discrimination litiga-
tion. See Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 409-10 (1987); Gould, The Idea of the Job as Property in
Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 895-99.
16. Absent an express commitment by the employer to the contrary, an employee
could be terminated at will, unless a collective bargaining agreement or civil service
regulation covered the employee in question. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
17. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505: 51-52 (Jan. 1989).
18. Id. Of the remaining 11 states, 10 states-Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, and Utah-either
have qualified their recognition of an exception or have failed to give an exception or
definitive state ruling on the possible exceptions to employment at will. Only one
state, Delaware, clearly does not recognize any of the exceptions to employment at
will.
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as progressive discipline and appeals procedures for disciplinary deci-
sions by line supervisors.19 Although these policy statements may not
always mention a just cause or similar standard for termination, they
do suggest that employee discharge determinations will be made for
reasons related to the employer's economic interests or on the basis of
uncorrected inferior work performance.
The leader in this area of reform was the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan,20 which found a public policy concern, in addition to holding
that express job security promises in a handbook were enforceable.
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the public policy concept
but accepted the personnel manual as a basis for contract, 21 an idea
followed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey22 and others.2 3 How-
ever, many courts still apply the at-will presumption to allow a dis-
charge in cases when such company policies exist but have not been
followed. These decisions may take the form of finding, contrary to
the affirmative statements in the employee handbook, that such repre-
sentations fail to show that the employer intended to be legally bound
by such statements24 or that the statements were merely offered as a
unilateral expression of good will, revocable at will and therefore in-
sufficient to justify reliance by employees.2 5
The implied contract exception based upon a handbook is only
available to employees in the fortunate situation of having an em-
ployer-issued policy statement. Moreover, even in the states that im-
pose an implied contract exception to the at-will rule, an employer
19. An excellent example is provided by the company handbook provisions issued
by Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., during the 1960s and discussed in Woolley v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 310-313, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271-73, modified, 101 N.J. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985).
20. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
21. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 453 N.E.2d 441,457 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982).
22. Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modi-
fied, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
23. See Comment, Limiting the Employment-At-Will Rule: Enforcing Policy
Manual Promises Through Unilateral Contract Analysis, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 465
(1986); Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on the Employ-
ment At Will Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1986); Note, Employee Handbooks and
Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196.
24. Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Mau v. Omaha
Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980).
25. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359,
1363 (D.S.C. 1985) (allowing unilateral change to manual by employer); Richardson
v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 109, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983)
(handbook unilaterally revised twice); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d




with a careful lawyer should not have trouble avoiding liability on this
basis. In response to the possible unilateral assumption of liability for
wrongful terminations, employers have revoked and rewritten job ap-
plications and handbooks expressly to deny any intent to grant con-
tractual rights to employees 26 or to indicate that any resulting
employment will be only at will.27
Aside from the employer's ability to eliminate or restrict contrac-
tual rights, policy declarations are likely to be confined to the more
enlightened businesses, and oral assurances are likely to be given only
to middle management or higher employees. Thus, the average
worker at the smaller plant or shop - the individual with the least
bargaining power who needs the most protection - is often without
contract rights.
B. The Public Policy Theory
The public policy theory is premised on the rationale that the
traditional formation of the at-will rule would undermine legislative
efforts to augment social welfare or would ratify behavior antagonistic
to general societal values encompassed in the common law. The pub-
lic policy theory does not displace the at-will presumption; rather, the
theory merely provides a mechanism for identifying improper grounds
for dismissal.
A variety of public policy theories have been recognized by state
courts to prevent an employer from acting contrary to an important
public policy. 28 Some courts have gone beyond the more standard
public policy exceptions and have recognized a cause of action when
an employer has sought to use its position for personal advantage.
This line of decisions is frequently called "abusive" or "retaliatory"
26. See, e.g., Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (N.D.
1986) (disclaimer in handbook relieves employer of duty to abide by progressive disci-
pline policy announced therein). But cf Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (unclear whether disciplinary policy in handbook
had become part of employment contract); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.
App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981) (subsequent oral assurance not binding because of
written disclaimer in handbook).
27. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); French v. Dillard
Dep't Stores, Inc., 285 Ark. 332, 686 S.W.2d 435 (1985). But cf Tirano v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.. 99 A.D.2d 675, 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1984).
28. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge for refusal to join price-fixing conspiracy); Petermann v.
Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (discharge for refusing to commit perjury); Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (discharge for reporting an employer or co-
worker for illegal acts); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978) (right to file a workers' compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for serving on jury).
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discharge cases. The leading decision sustained a suit by a female em-
ployee who was terminated for her refusal to date her foreman.
29
However, other courts have refused to remedy similar retaliatory ac-
tion or personal abuse related to employment discharges. 30 The prac-
tical significance of the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine is that they are grounded on tort theory. For the em-
ployer, this means that punitive as well as compensatory damages are
potentially available to the complaining employee. For the employee,
the tort label could require that he show that his employer had an
intention to inflict harm or at least show the negligent or reckless in-
fliction of such harm. 3'
The major difficulty for courts in applying the public policy the-
ory is the identification of the relevant public policy. Some academic
commentators believe that all unjust terminations subvert the public's
interest in industrial stability. 32 The trend among the courts, however,
is to require that the public policy relied upon be "well accepted" and
"clearly articulated,"'33 or that it be "evidenced by a constitutional or
statutory provision."'34 For the workers subjected to arbitrary treat-
ment or personally motivated action, this theory provides little relief.
Moreover, some courts have declared the whole concept of public pol-
icy unsuited for judicial application in the employee dismissal context
and believe the creation of "new torts" to be a matter best left to the
legislature. 35 Consequently, except in the most egregious circum-
stances, 36 or when an employer acts with a clear intent to inflict emo-
tional injury on the worker, the public policy exceptions provide no
guaranteed haven for the wrongfully terminated employee.
29. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
But cf Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 296-97, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274
(1980).
30. E.g., Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 631 S.W.2d 263 (1982); Fawcett v. G.C.
Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
31. Leonard, supra note 9, at 662.
32. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1948 (1983).
33. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 367, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474
(1984) (Williams, C.J., dissenting). See also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
34. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840
(1983). See also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
35. Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 302, 448 N.E.2d 86,
89, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983) ("Both of these aspects of the issue, involving
perception and declaration of public policy - are best and more appropriately ex-
plored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government."). See also Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
36. See Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982)
(employee dismissed without prior warning and forced to sign a letter of resignation
1989]
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C. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Theory
The third judicial qualification of the employment-at-will doc-
trine is based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Courts
have required that employment relationships demonstrate the same
standard of good faith and fair dealing implied in commercial relation-
ships based on some type of agreement or understanding. The basic
premise is that the employer is acting in bad faith, contrary to reason-
able standards of fairness toward the employee, when it wrongfully
discharges the employee. This theory can be predicated on both con-
tract and tort principles and may, therefore, be the most expansive of
the three theories. The good faith and fair dealing theory relies upon
subjectivity, assessing employer motivation as an issue and penalizing
those motivations that either a judge or jury consider improper.37 As
a result, the damages awarded under this theory vary widely between
jurisdictions.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory was first re-
lated to employment contracts by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 38 Fortune and
other decisions 39 treat breaches of the covenant as sounding in con-
tract without even considering any tort implications. In contrast,
other courts, particularly in California, have expanded the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing beyond the limits of a strictly contractual
relationship in the employment context. In Cleary v. American Air-
lines, 40 the California Court of Appeal suggested that the breach of the
covenant may sound in tort as well, thereby opening the door for puni-
tive damages in addition to compensatory damages. The suggestion
that there may be a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing has been accepted by other courts.41 However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's recent decision in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp.42 curtailed the development of a tortious breach of the covenant
of good faith. In Foley, a four to three court held that because "the
employment relationship is fundamentally contractual.. ., contractual
which subsequently barred her unemployment benefits claim; promise of favorable
recommendation was also breached).
37. Leonard, supra note 9, at 655.
38. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
39. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
40. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
41. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App.
1984); Eller v. Houston's Restaurants, Inc., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2651, 2653-54
(D.D.C. 1984); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Mont.
1984); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
42. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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remedies should remain the sole available relief for breaches of...
good faith and fair dealing in the employment context. '43
Several courts have rejected a broad application of the implied
covenant of good faith. In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,
the New York Court of Appeals held that any implied covenant would
have to be "in aid and furtherance of other terms of the agreement of
the parties." 44 The Murphy court further observed that the plaintiff's
employment in this instance was at will, providing the employer free-
dom to terminate. The court concluded: "In the context of such an
employment it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be
drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would
be destructive of his right of termination. '45 Judicial reluctance to
engraft the covenant of good faith and fair dealing onto the employ-
ment relationship likely stems from the poor fit between employment
agreements and commercial contract doctrine. It is difficult to borrow
economic-based standards governing contracts between merchants
and apply them to the more personalized employment relationship. 46
Therefore, the implied covenant of good faith theory appears unlikely
to become "a universally accepted panacea for wrongfully discharged
employees." 47
The application of any one of these three theories, each derived
from traditional legal doctrine, to the employment relationship is
problematic. Employee termination disputes do not always mesh eas-
ily with the contract domain. Although the employment relationship
is founded on an agreement, many of the relevant terms are not the
product of conscious bargaining. The employment "contract" does
not seem to fall within the exchange transaction model characteristic
of commercial contract law.48 Similarly, discharge disputes often fit
into tort law only with difficulty. While a dismissal may be lacking in
objective justification and appear to be unfair, absent substantiated
tortious behavior, the employee's injury does not seem to be tort-like.
43. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
44. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 48 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983). Ac-
cord Walker v. Modem Realty, 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982); Gordon v. Matthew
Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memo-
rial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109
Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla.
1987); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
45. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
46. Leonard, supra note 9, at 656-57.
47. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 64-65 (1988).
48. Minda, The Common Law of Employment At- Will in New York: The Paraly-
sis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 959-60 (1985).
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IV. JUDICIAL ACTION IN ALASKA
Although the employment-at-will doctrine is not codified in the
Alaska statutes, the at-will rule is treated by the Alaska judiciary as
having application to indefinite term contracts in Alaska.49 Neverthe-
less, perhaps in response to the erosion of the employment-at-will doc-
trine by other state courts, during the past six years the Alaska
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to consider exceptions to
the at-will rule.
In Mitford v. de Lasala, 50 the Alaska Supreme Court recognized
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all at-will em-
ployment situations. The court in Mitford noted that it had previously
implied the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance con-
text.51 The Mitford court then explained the application of the theory
to the employment situation by discussing the facts of two Massachu-
setts cases. Both of the cases, like Mitford, involved an allegation that
a discharge decision was motivated by a desire to deprive the employee
of his agreed share of company profits.52 Finally, the court held that
Mitford's employment contract contained an implied covenant of
good faith.53
Seven days later in Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical 54 the
Alaska Supreme Court recorded its acceptance of the implied contract
theory. Although in Eales the contract in question was deemed to be
one for a definite period, the court stated that the result would have
been the same even if the contract were considered to be at will. The
court in Eales stated that:
Evidence was presented that it was represented to Eales that so long
as he was properly performing his duties he would not be dis-
charged. This representation may be found to be part of Eales' em-
ployment contract, even if the employment contract was for an
indefinite period of time. If so, the Clinic would be precluded from
discharging Eales except for good cause.55
49. See Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1971).
50. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983). For a more complete discussion of the case, see
Crook, Employment at Will: The "American Rule" and its Application in Alaska, 2
ALASKA L. REv. 23, 35-36 (1985).
51. Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1006 (citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979)).
52. Id. at 1006-07 (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), and Maddaloni v. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, 386
Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982)).
53. Id. at 1007.
54. 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983). For a more complete discussion of the case, see
Crook, supra note 50, at 35-36.
55. Eales, 663 P.2d at 959.
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Thus, in Mitford, the Alaska Supreme Court established that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in all at-will employ-
ment contracts. In Eales, the court accepted the implied contract the-
ory by ruling that certain employer representations can transform an
employment contract otherwise terminable at will into one which can
be terminated only for good cause.
The next wrongful discharge case before the Alaska Supreme
Court, State v. Haley, 56 involved a state employee who alleged that she
was terminated for exercising her first amendment rights. The court
found the plaintiff was fired either because of her past statements or
for her refusal to limit future speech. Both of these were deemed to be
unconstitutional reasons for termination of a state employee. The
Haley court found implicit in the employment contract the state's
promise not to terminate for an unconstitutional reason. This promise
"is analogous to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing we re-
cently implied in a private sector at-will employment contract."' 57 The
court held that when the state terminates an employee for an unconsti-
tutional reason it amounts to unfair dealing as a matter of law, giving
rise to contract remedies.5 8
The public policy theory was first addressed by the Alaska
Supreme Court in Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc. 5 9 The case
concerned the discharge of a security guard who was employed by a
security company guarding the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. At the close of
employee Knight's case, the trial court dismissed the complaint be-
cause "it, as phrased, does not state a cause of action."' 60 The court
also rejected Knight's motion to amend the complaint. The Alaska
Supreme Court, upon review, found that the trial court had erred in
granting the employer's motion to dismiss. The court stated:
Although paragraph V of the complaint alleges that [the pipeline
operator] caused [Knight's employer] to fire Knight, the complaint
does allege that [Knight's employer] did, in fact, fire Knight and
goes on to allege in paragragh VI that his termination was (1) in
violation of public policy, (2) in breach of an implied covenant of
fair dealing and good faith, and (3) not based upon good or just
cause.
61
After mentioning the growing acceptance of the public policy theory,
the court in Knight stated that it had never rejected the theory. 62 The
court then concluded that claims under the public policy theory, like
56. 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984).
57. Id. at 318.
58. Id.
59. 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986).
60. Id. at 791.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 792.
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the implied contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing theories, may afford terminated employees relief.63 Because the
lower court had granted the employer's motion to dismiss, however,
there was not a full record on which to determine whether the public
policy theory was applicable to the case. Nevertheless, the statements
of the court in the Knight opinion suggest that the public policy theory
may be an additional avenue of complaint for the unjustly dismissed
employee in Alaska.
The Knight decision also contains language suggesting that the
Alaska Supreme Court had an unorthodox view concerning the appli-
cation of the public policy separating the overlap of the three theories.
The Knight court stated that "it seems that the public policy approach
is largely encompassed within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing which we accepted in Mitford. "64 The public policy the-
ory is generally regarded as a tort theory. 65 While the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing has been predicated upon both contract
and tort, 66 the Alaska decisions applying this theory had only given
rise to contract remedies.67 By stating that a tort theory - the public
policy approach - was included within the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, was the court suggesting that it would recognize tort rem-
edies for a breach of the covenant? Moreover, could the breach of the
covenant of good faith itself be considered as being violative of state
public policy? Unfortunately for the Alaska plaintiffs' employment re-
lations bar, the court failed to provide any guidelines on how the pub-
lic policy theory could be articulated as a judicially recognized avenue
of complaint. Consequently, beginning with the Knight opinion, the
precise parameters of many wrongful discharge claims in Alaska be-
came confusing and unclear.
In ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers,68 the Alaska Supreme Court rec-
ognized the need both for a clarification on the boundaries of wrongful
discharge in Alaska and for a delineation of the available avenues of
complaint for the discharged employee. In ARCO, after a jury award
of both compensatory and punitive damages for the breach of the im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing, the employer, ARCO Alaska,
Inc., appealed. On appeal, the supreme court held that a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not constitute a tort for
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Feinrnan, supra note 7, at 131-35.
66. See supra note 23, and Leonard, supra note 9, at 662.
67. See Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 631 (Alaska 1986); Mitford v.
de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); Skagway City School Bd. v. Davis, 543
P.2d 218, 225 (Alaska 1975); Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719, 724 (Alaska 1971).
68. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
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which punitive damages are recoverable. 69 The court observed that it
had previously allowed the awarding of contract damages only in
wrongful discharge cases, and that only when "a party's conduct in
breaching a contract rises to the level of a traditionally recognized
tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, [will] an action
in tort ... lie."' 70 Accordingly, the court reversed the jury award of
punitive damages. Although not stated in ARCO, "the extension of
tort remedies to the employment relation.., involves 'policy' choices
which may 'profoundly' affect social and commercial relations." 71
Therefore, by failing to extend tort damages to a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith, the Alaska Supreme Court may merely be sug-
gesting that the contemplation of such an extension "is a matter best
left to the Legislature." '72
The court in ARCO also addressed the public policy theory. In
dicta, the court first emphasized that it has "neither accepted nor re-
jected the public policy theory."' 73 This statement retreats from the
conclusion in Knight 74 that a claim under the public policy theory "at
least possibly" 75 would afford wrongful discharge relief. The Knight
conclusion seemed to suggest that the public policy theory had been
accepted by the court, and would afford relief, if the theory was ade-
quately supported by the facts on record. The trial court in ARCO
had held that "[b]ad faith breach of employment contracts should...
be deemed violative of state public policy."' 76 The trial judge's finding
was a reasonable interpretation of the supreme court's stated belief in
Knight that the public policy theory is encompassed within the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.77 However, according to the
ARCO court, "this approach is unsound" 78 because "[u]nder this the-
ory, any breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would
come under the public policy exception."' 79 Therefore, before the
plaintiffs' employment relations bar is informed as to the availability of
the public policy theory in Alaska, a wrongfully terminated worker
must allege an explicit public policy, 80 which the plaintiff in ARCO
had failed to do.
69. Id. at 1153.
70. Id. at 1154.
71. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 719, 765 P.2d 373, 415, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 253 (1988) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. ARCO, 753 P.2d at 1153.
74. 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986).
75. Id. at 792.




80. ARCO, 753 P.2d at 1153.
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In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., the Alaska Supreme
Court considered for the first time "some parameters of the tort of
wrongful discharge. ' 81 In Luedtke, two employees were fired after
they refused to submit to urinalysis under their employer's drug test-
ing program. The employees claimed, inter alia, that the employer's
drug testing demands violated the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing implicit in all Alaska employment relationships.
The Luedtke court set out the key distinction between at-will em-
ployees and employees hired for a determinable length of time: "Em-
ployees hired on an at-will basis can be fired for any reason that does
not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. How-
ever, employees hired for a specific term may not be discharged before
the expiration of the term except for good cause."'8 2 Furthermore, the
court concluded that "there is a public policy supporting the protec-
tion of employee privacy."8s3 In so ruling, the court stated that it
"look[s] to the entire body of law in the state of Alaska for evidence of
citizen rights, duties and responsibilities, to determine the public pol-
icy with regard to employee privacy."'8 4 Violation of that policy may
rise to the level of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Although the Luedtke decision helps identify who makes
the public policy for application of a public policy exception, the court
has yet to accept the public policy theory. Moreover, Alaska's highest
court continues to view the tort-based public policy theory as a possi-
ble sub-theory of relief under the covenant of good faith.
Thus, after Luedtke, the parameters of a wrongful discharge chal-
lenge in Alaska are the following: (1) employees hired for a specific
term cannot be fired without "good cause;" (2) at-will employees in
Alaska may be terminated for any reason not violating the implied
covenant of good faith; (3) the tort-based public policy theory is a pos-
sible sub-theory of relief for at-will workers under the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and (4) contract damages, and not punitive
damages, are the only recoverable measure of damages for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Alaska Supreme Court has created a "management paradise"
by refusing either to require "good cause" for an at-will termination or
to allow the recovery of punitive damages under an independent pub-
lic policy basis. The serious consequences that result from making
particular employer conduct actionable in tort may explain the court's
81. 768 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Alaska 1989).
82. Id. at 1131 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 1130.
84. Id. at 1132.
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reluctance to recognize the public policy theory of wrongful dis-
charge. 85 In fact, the court may simply be deferring to the state legis-
lature the consideration and difficult application of a tort-based public
policy exception.8 6 Nevertheless, reforms are necessary in the laws of
the Alaska workplace to ensure that the employment relationship in
Alaska adheres to society's general values of fairness. The necessary
contemplation and drafting of those reforms should be a legislative,
rather than a judicial, undertaking. The Alaska Legislature is better
able to balance the establishment of desirable employee rights with the
economic costs that would result to the employer and, as a conse-
quence, to the public.
V. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LEGISLATION
A. The Need for Legislation
Justice William 0. Douglas once said: "Employability is the
greatest asset most people have."87 Only three groups of employees,
however, have historically been protected from arbitrary discharge,
either in situations where the employee has substantial bargaining
power or through limitations established by legislation. First, employ-
ees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated by
85. The availability of punitive awards before juries which are frequently hostile
to employers has often meant excessive, arbitrary, inconsistent judgments. See gener-
ally K. LOPATKA & J. MARTIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, ABA
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION OF
PRIVACY CLAIMS 13-18 (1986); Jung & Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4
LAB. LAW. 257 (Spring 1988). From the employee's perspective, actions before juries
are often financial trials by combat in which, even for plaintiffs who retain representa-
tion on contingency, the cost of proceeding is substantial.
86. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 663. Professor Leonard writes:
Traditional tort elements appear irrelevant to some of the issues central to a
termination dispute, and the common-law tort compensation scheme may
provide an inappropriate measure for damages. Thus, the equivocal em-
brace of tort as a basis for the public policy exception is quite understand-
able, and it is not surprising that some courts have expressed reluctance to
recognize a tort-based public policy exception without legislative backing.
Id. Professor Leonard argues for a restructuring of the common law presumption that
"would require employers to advance a plausible reason for termination when an em-
ployee could show that the job continued to exist and the employee was qualified to
continue performing it, and would award suitable make-whole damages if threatened
litigation could not be settled." Id. at 685. This presumption, argues Professor Leo-
nard, would force the legislatures or Congress to come up with a better solution to the
problem of job termination if it disapproved of the new "just cause" presumption. Id.
at 685-86.
87. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 95 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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their respective unions are typically not fired except for "just cause." 88
Second, entertainers, corporate executives and other highly paid indi-
viduals have sufficient independent bargaining power to negotiate writ-
ten contracts with fixed and definite provisions. In such arrangements,
the employer's duty to discharge only for "just cause" is implied by
law or expressly set forth in the employment agreement.8 9 Third, pub-
lic employees covered by state and federal civil service statutes gener-
ally cannot be discharged unless for "just cause" and not until they
have had a hearing, which is subject to court review. 90
The remaining nonunion private sector exceeds sixty percent of
the American work force and consists of over sixty-five million em-
ployees, and, yet, for them there has been no blanket protection from
the employment-at-will doctrine. 91 In fact, the United States remains
the last major industrial democracy that has not enacted unjust dis-
charge legislation.92
The courts have provided some relief through the modest expan-
sion and modification of well-established common law principles. 93
However, as the discussion of the Alaska Supreme Court decisions in-
dicates, 94 the three theories of wrongful discharge provide only limited
and inadequate remedies to the wrongfully discharged, nonunion, at-
will employee. Nevertheless, the judicial responses demonstrate a rec-
ognition that "[t]he employee has a valuable interest in his or her job
which ought not be arbitrarily taken away."'95 Motivated by the
courts and the academic commentators, American legislatures are
now beginning to realize that a job satisfies many social, emotional and
psychological needs for the American worker.
88. For a discussion of the "just cause" provisions in labor agreements as inter-
preted by arbitrators, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
650-707 (4th ed. 1985).
89. Bartlett v. Doctors Hosp., 422 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
90. See, e.g., Federal Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7514 (1982).
91. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiffs Per-
spective, 67 NEB. L. REv. 178, 180 (1988).
92. For at least a decade, protection against wrongful discharge has been provided
by statute in at least 60 countries, including all the Common Market countries, Swe-
den, Norway, Japan, Canada and others in Africa, Asia and South America. See
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE REC-
ORD 170, 175 (1981).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 3-48.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 50-87.
95. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 15 (1988).
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B. Legislative Developments
The last five years have produced a multitude of legislative activ-
ity concerning wrongful discharge. A special committee of the Labor
and Employment Law Section of the State Bar of California has rec-
ommended statutory regulation of unjust termination.96 Under the
proposed regulation, any employee who worked twenty hours a week
for at least two years would have the right to challenge his dismissal
by filing a complaint with the state Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice. If mediation failed to resolve the dispute, the bill would require
that the dispute be submitted to binding arbitration. The Individual
Rights Committee of the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section,
Committee on Employee Rights and Responsibilities, Subcommittee
on At-Will Legislation, drafted a questionnaire concerning the critical
issues to be considered in any proposed legislation.97 The Committee
is now studying the issues and developing "cafeteria" model statutes
containing alternative options for interested state legislators. The
AFL-CIO's Executive Council has reversed organized labor's long-
standing opposition by advocating strong support for the concept of
wrongful discharge legislation. 98 Commentators suggest that legisla-
tion prohibiting dismissal without cause should actually prove to be
both directly and indirectly beneficial to labor unions. 99 Finally, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have decided to draft a model
statute. 100
Bills forbidding wrongful discharge have been introduced in at
least a dozen legislatures. °10 Broad dismissal statutes have been
adopted in Puerto Rico102 and the Virgin Islands;' 0 3 in 1987, Montana
became the first state to enact a comprehensive law protecting employ-
ees against wrongful discharge. °4
96. St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 58.
97. 1 LAB. LAW. 784 (1985).
98. 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 2, 1987, at 1.
99. See St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 69-70; Gould, Job Security in the United
States: Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a
Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 28, 41 n.73 (1988).
100. St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 58.
101. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin and the United States
Congress. See St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 58.
102. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1985).
103. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 65 (1970).
104. Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, 1987 Mont. Laws ch. 641 (now
codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987)).
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C. Analysis of Legislative Proposals
The Alaska Supreme Court has been struggling for nearly a dec-
ade to articulate legal rules governing worker terminations. The
court, however, lacks the capacity to construct an administrative ap-
paratus for enforcement purposes. Therefore, in order to protect fully
the interest most nonunion Alaska employees have in their employ-
ment, specialized legislation is necessary.
A federal statute applying uniformly to employers nationwide,
while clearly the most effective solution, seems unlikely in the near
future. 105 Consequently, bills are increasingly being drafted and con-
sidered by the state legislatures. The Alaska Legislature should con-
sider a bill of its own, taking what it believes to be the best features
from the alternatives represented by the various other state bills and
the draft by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 106
In addition to the statute enacted in Montana, 0 7 bills have been
drafted in other states in the past decade to provide "just cause" pro-
tection to nonunion, at-will employees. 0 8 In this section, the princi-
pal issues confronted by Montana's statutory proposal will be
discussed. Finally, if a provision in the Montana statute differs signifi-
cantly from the alternative responses of the other states' bills, the dif-
fering legislative responses will be mentioned.
Compared to most statutory enactments, the Montana statute is
brief, consisting of only nine sections. The first section merely states
the title of the law: "Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act."10 9
In the second section, the legislature articulates its purpose as setting
forth the rights and remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. Ad-
ditionally, this section provides that, apart from the rights and reme-
dies set forth in the statute, employment in Montana will still be
considered at-will provided it has "no specified term."' 1o
105. St Antoine, supra note 47, at 71; Tobias, supra note 91, at 191.
106. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently formed a commit-
tee to draft a model statute on employment termination. When this proposed model
statute is completed, it will provide a valuable additional resource in the drafting of a
bill to protect the nonunion worker in Alaska. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
108. See St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 71.
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
110. Id. § 39-2-902.
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Section three provides definitions of "discharge,"' I 11 "constructive
discharge,""i 2 "employee""i 3 and "fringe benefits." 114 The section
also defines "good cause" 115 and "public policy." 116
Section four provides three distinct causes of action for wrongful
discharge. The first subsection creates an action for "the employee's
refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public
policy.""I7 This action contains the main features of the public policy
theory discussed above. Subsection two establishes an action on behalf
of employees who have passed "the employer's probationary pe-
riod""" if their discharge "was not for good cause." 19 In essence,
this action substitutes a just cause standard for the at-will doctrine.
The third action, created by subsection three, protects against dis-
charges that violate the express provisions of written personnel poli-
cies. 120 This action essentially adopts the implied contract theory
discussed above.
111. Id. § 39-2-903(2). "'Discharge' includes a constructive discharge as defined
in subsection (1) and any other termination of employment including resignation,
elimination of the job, layoff for lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and any other
cutback in the number of employees for a legitimate business reason." Id.
112. Id. § 39-2-903(1).
"Constructive discharge" means the voluntary termination of employment
by an employee because of a situation created by an act or omission of the
employer which an objective, reasonable person would find so intolerable
that voluntary termination is the only reasonable alternative. Constructive
discharge does not mean voluntary termination because of an employer's
refusal to promote the employee or improve wages, responsibilities, or other
terms and conditions of employment.
Id.
113. Id. § 39-2-903(3). "'Employee' means a person who works for another for
hire. The term does not include a person who is an independent contractor." Id.
114. Id. § 39-2-903(4). "'Fringe benefits' means the value of any employer-paid
vacation leave, sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability insurance plan, life insur-
ance plan, and pension benefit plan in force on the date of the termination." Id.
115. Id. § 39-2-903(5). "'Good cause' means reasonable job-related grounds for
dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the em-
ployer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." Id.
116. Id. § 39-2-903(7). "'Public policy' means a policy in effect at the time of the
discharge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by constitutional
provision, statute, or administrative rule." Id.
117. Id. § 39-2-904(1).
118. It is generally recognized in collective bargaining agreements and elsewhere
that so-called "probationary" employees are not entitled to just cause protections be-
cause until an employee has been part of an organization for some measurable time he
cannot reasonably feel he possesses a right in his position. St. Antoine, supra note 47,
at 73. See also Howlett, Due Process for Non- Unionized Employees: A Practical Propo-
sal, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 164, 167 (B. Dennis, ed. 1980).
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1987).
120. Id. § 39-2-904(3).
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Section five provides the remedies for a wrongful discharge.' 21
The basic remedy is "lost wages and fringe benefits for a period not to
exceed four years from the date of discharge, together with interest
thereon." If the discharge violates the "public policy" cause of action,
section 39-2-904(2), and the employer "engaged in... actual malice in
the discharge of the employee," the court may award punitive dam-
ages.122 The Montana statute makes no mention of possible reinstate-
ment, thereby avoiding the problem of compelling an unwanted
association.
Alternatively, the California bill provides an elaborate set of rem-
edies including reinstatement, back pay with interest, income and re-
lated losses for two years if reinstatement is inappropriate and
attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party.' 23 The Michigan bill
is very similar; it includes a "severance payment" but not attorney's
fees.' 24 By providing limited remedies for wrongful discharge, the var-
ious legislative responses should provide an incentive for settlement
and effectively discourage frivolous litigation.
The last four sections of the Montana wrongful discharge statute
concern the administration of the wrongful discharge action. Section
six provides a one-year statute of limitations 125 and requires a plaintiff
to exhaust all internal appeals procedures before resorting to litigation.
Section seven avoids encroachment on existing statutory remedies and
preemption problems. The section provides that any discharge subject
to state or federal procedures for "contesting the dispute," or any dis-
charge involving an employee covered by a written collective bargain-
ing agreement, will not be covered by the Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act. Section eight expressly preempts claims brought
pursuant to common law tort or contract theories. 26 Lastly, section
nine authorizes the disputing parties to agree to submit the dispute to
final and binding arbitration. To encourage arbitration, subsection
four of section nine provides that attorney's fees may be awarded to a
prevailing party whose offer to arbitrate was refused. 127 In addition,
section nine provides that, if the discharged employee makes an offer
to arbitrate and wins the arbitration, the costs of the arbitration will be
paid by the employer.' 28 Finally, while submission of the dispute to
121. Id. § 39-2-905(3).
122. Id. § 39-2-905(2).
123. St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 79.
124. Id.
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(1) (1987).
126. Id. §§ 39-2-912, 39-2-913.
127. Id. § 39-2-914(4).
128. Id. § 39-2-914(5).
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arbitration terminates the right to litigate the discharge, the arbitra-
tor's decision is subject to review under provisions of the Uniform Ar-
bitration Act. 129
While the Montana statute clearly makes arbitration the pre-
ferred dispute resolution alternative, the California and Michigan bills
specifically provide for arbitration of unjust dismissal disputes. Addi-
tionally, the California and Michigan bills provide for a preliminary
mediation stage of minimum duration, designed to facilitate settle-
ments and the elimination of weak complaints along the way.130 By
either providing incentives for, or requiring the parties to submit their
disputes to, arbitration, wrongful discharge legislation seeks to reduce
the flood of lawsuits currently burdening the courts.
The elimination of jury trials and unregulated punitive awards
should be attractive to employers, even in states such as Alaska where
the court has not yet advocated a tort-based theory or punitive dam-
ages. Corporate insurance policies rarely cover liability related to fir-
ings.131 A wrongful discharge statute provides a framework whereby
the employment relationship rules are known by all involved parties.
To avoid the "just cause" standard in most wrongful discharge legisla-
tion, an employer may still hire independent contractors. 132 Contrac-
tors would remain subject to the at-will doctrine because they lack the
reasonable employment expectations characteristic of permanent em-
ployees that gave rise to erosion of the common law rule.
Montana's worker discharge statute, not unlike the reaction to
most unique legislation, has recently been subjected to constitutional
challenge. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act after two cases questioned
the constitutional propriety of the Act.1 33 In Meech v. Hillhaven West,
Inc., the Montana Supreme Court was asked to address two questions:
(1) whether the Act "serves to wrongfully deprive an individual falling
within the purview of the Act from his or her right to 'full legal re-
dress' within the meaning of Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitu-
tion;"1 34 and (2) whether "provisions of the [Act] which expressly
prohibit recovery of noneconomic damages, and limit the recovery of
punitive damages, [are] violative of an individual's right to 'full legal
129. Id. § 39-2-914(6).
130. St. Antoine, supra note 47, at 78.
131. See Barrett, Wrongful-Dismissal Laws May Feel Effect of Dispute Before Mon-
tana's High Court, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at BI, col. 3.
132. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
133. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 488 (1989); Johnson v.
Montana, - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 1221 (1989).
134. Meech, - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 488, 489 (1989).
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redress' within the meaning of Article II, § 16 of the Montana Consti-
tution." 135 The Meech court answered "no" to both questions. 36
The Meech court held that there is no "fundamental right" to full
legal redress created by article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitu-
tion; therefore, the Act does not violate this section. 137 In addition,
the court held that the Act is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, thereby surviving equal protection scrutiny. 38 According to
a majority of the Montana Supreme Court, Montana's worker dis-
charge statute provides greater certainty in the law and may alleviate
problems experienced by both employers and employees. 139 The court
stated:
"[T]he employees who benefit [under common-law causes of
action] are few and far between, first, because of the difficulties in-
volved in staying the course of a lengthy and expensive judicial pro-
cess, and second, because of limitations inherent in the legal
doctrines adopted by the courts." Therefore, Meech's argument
that the Act provides an inadequate trade for prior common-law
actions fails to provide authority for finding the Act
unconstitutional. ' 40
Thus, the first wrongful discharge legislation to be enacted has sur-
vived state constitutional challenge. It is yet to be seen whether this
setback will discourage opposition and court challenges to wrongful
discharge legislation being considered elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
The employment-at-will doctrine is no longer consonant with the
modem employment relationship. Recognizing this development, the
Alaska Supreme Court has struggled to establish exceptions to the
common law rule on a piecemeal basis. However, the highest court in
Alaska has created a "management paradise" both by its reluctance to
accept the tort-based public policy theory as a distinct ground for re-
lief and by its refusal to allow punitive damages for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith. The Alaska Supreme Court's position
essentially caps damage awards for wrongful termination while pro-
viding the Alaska at-will employee minimal protection from unjust
dismissal.
Wrongful discharge disputes involve the perception and declara-
tion of public policy considerations better explored and resolved by the
135. Id. at -- , 776 P.2d at 489.
136. Id.
137. Id. at -- , 776 P.2d at 491.
138. Id. at -- , 776 P.2d at 501.
139. Id. at -- , 776 P.2d at 506.
140. Id. (quoting Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbi-
tration, 13 EMi. REL. L.J. 404, 413 (1988)).
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legislature. Through legislation, the Alaska Legislature can broaden
the protections afforded Alaska employees while restricting the avail-
able remedies at the same time, thus striking a middle ground consis-
tent with the modem employment relationship. If the Alaska
Legislature fears that excessive damage awards would discourage busi-
ness development, it should place restrictions on the remedies avail-
able under its version of a wrongful discharge act. However, contrary
to the current position of the Alaska Supreme Court, at-will employ-
ees in Alaska should be entitled to a "just cause" discharge standard in
exchange for any remedy limitations imposed upon them.
Mark A. Redmiles

